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The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v Board of Educa-
tion' stands as a benchmark in two great revolutions. The first was
social: the forced integration of schoolchildren played a key role in
the struggle for racial equality. The second was judicial. In Brown,
the Supreme Court "committed the federal courts to an enterprise
of profound social reconstruction. ' 2 Other forms of nontraditional
litigation soon followed, such as challenges to legislative districting,
suits assailing practices of mental hospitals and police depart-
ments, environmental enforcement actions, and constitutional at-
tacks on government expenditures and statutes.3
In his seminal article, Professor Abram Chayes identified
these cases with the emergence of a new model of litigatipn: "pub-
lic law litigation."' 4 He contrasts traditional litigation, which he
characterizes as a mode of settling private disputes, with public
law litigation, which instead centers on a "grievance about the con-
tent or conduct of policy-most often governmental policy, but fre-
quently the policy of nongovernmental aggregates."'5 Public law
cases usually set out "to vindicate important social values that af-
fect numerous individuals and entities."6 According to Professor
t B.A. 1987, Baylor University; J.D. Candidate 1990, The University of Chicago.
347 US 483 (1954) (Brown I: finding segregation of schools unconstitutional); and 349
US 294 (1955) (Brown II: upholding broad powers of court to remedy segregation).
2 Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 Harv L Rev 4, 6 (1982). See also Richard H. Fallon, Of Jus-
ticiability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59
NYU L Rev 1, 1-3 (1984).
See, for example, Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) (voter attack on legislative district-
ing); Mills v Rogers, 457 US 291 (1982) (right of mental patients to refuse treatment);
United States v SCRAP, 412 US 669 (1973) (citizen challenge of ICC order for failure to
include environment impact statement); Rizzo v Goode, 423 US 362 (1976) (citizen chal-
lenge of police procedures); and Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83 (1968) (taxpayer challenge to use
of federal funds for religious education materials).
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv L Rev 1281,
1281-84 (1976).
1 Chayes, 96 Harv L Rev at 4-5 (cited in note 2); and Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1281-
84.
, Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 Cor-
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Chayes, the primary attributes of public law litigation follow from
this distinction. These cases often involve sprawling party struc-
tures, an emphasis on legislative factfinding, prospective relief,
ongoing decrees that affect widespread interests, and active in-
volvement by judges."
Although some commentators have debated its legitimacy,"
public law litigation remains a significant phenomenon with which
federal courts must contend. Adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the passage of legislation facilitating constitutional
claims and creating statutory rights and remedies have increased
the situations in which courts are called upon to render judgments
affecting widespread social interests.9 In addition, Congress fre-
quently relies on the courts to monitor executive enforcement of its
statutory schemes by combining indefinite delegations with provi-
sions for judicial review.'0 Public law litigation is now rooted in
"legal consciousness," or the way in which our society thinks about
law and the legal system."'
Because public law cases usually involve high stakes and wide-
spread impacts, their adjudication often "call[s] for adequate rep-
resentation in the proceedings of the range of interests that will be
affected by them."' 2 Public interest groups have been instrumental
nell L Rev 270, 270 n 1 (1989).
Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1302 (cited in note 4); Chayes, 96 Harv L Rev at 5 (cited in
note 2). Professor Chayes's work has spawned a significant body of literature. Some com-
mentators have questioned the prevalence of public law litigation. See, for example, Arthur
R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 Harv L Rev 664, 692 & nn 124-27 (1979). Others disagree about the
defining features of public law litigation. See, for example, Tobias, 74 Cornell L Rev at 340
(cited in note 6). However, virtually all commentators agree that these nontraditional cases
raise new, significant issues.
8 See, for example, Tobias, 74 Cornell L Rev at 271 n 2.
' William Burnham, Aspirational and Existential Interests of Social Reform Organi-
zations: A New Role for the Ideological Plaintiff, 20 Harv CR-CL L Rev 153, 153 (1985).
Professor Burnham cites the following as examples of legislation creating private enforce-
ment mechanisms: 42 USC § 1983 (1982) (civil actions for deprivation of constitutional
rights); 42 USC § 2000a (1982) (discrimination in public accommodations); 42 USC § 2000e
(1982) (employment discrimination); 42 USC § 3601 (1982) (housing discrimination); and 42
USC § 1997 (1982) (rights of persons confined to institutions). Id at 4.
10 Edward Levi, The Business of the Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective,
70 FRD 79, 214 (1976).
" Chayes, 96 Harv L Rev at 8 (cited in note 2).
12 Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1310 (cited in note 4). See also Jack B. Weinstein, Litiga-
tion Seeking Changes in Public Behavior and Institutions-Some Views on Participation,
13 UC Davis L Rev 231, 246 (1980); and Emma Coleman Jones, Litigation Without Repre-




in filling this role.13 Over the years, they have grown dramatically
in number and in political power, and they have turned to the
courts to pursue objectives unachievable through political
processes.14 Brown v Board of Education exemplifies the involve-
ment of public interest groups in many of the Supreme Court's
landmark decisions. Thurgood Marshall represented the appellants
before the Court as an attorney for the NAACP; the American
Jewish Congress, the ACLU, and the American Federation of
Teachers filed supporting amicus curiae briefs. 5
As in Brown, public interest groups have achieved many of
their greatest successes by serving as legal counsel to parties and
by submitting amicus briefs. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)
offers a third route by which public interest groups may partici-
pate in litigation. It requires a court to permit intervention upon
demonstration by the applicant of a sufficient stake in the outcome
of the litigation. 6
This Comment explores intervention by public interest groups
in public law cases under Rule 24(a). Section I briefly, describes
Rule 24 and examines the standards that various federal circuits
use to decide whether a public interest group may intervene in a
case. Section II argues that a court should weigh the interests be-
hind Rule 24(a) differently when a public interest group seeks to
intervene in a public law case. Finally, section III proposes a
13 Although numerous and diverse organizations could fall under the rubric of "public
interest group," this Comment focuses on those organizations that advocate policies affect-
ing diffuse and widespread interests-for example, the NAACP, the ACLU, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, and the National Rifle Association. Under this definition, public in-
terest groups may be distinguished from special interest groups, which advocate policies
that primarily affect their own members. A trade association is an example of a special
interest group.
14 NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 429-30 & n 12 (1963). See also Karen Orren, Standing
to Sue: Interest Groups in the Federal Courts, 70 Am Pol Sci Rev 723, 724 (1976); and
Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L J 694,
710 (1963). For a history of the development of public interest legal groups and public inter-
est law, see Robert A. Baum, Public Interest Law: Where Law Meets Social Action 44-60
(Oceana, 1987); and Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Fi-
nancing Public Interest Law in America 19-70 (1976).
'5 Brown I, 347 US at 485. Supreme Court cases in the last two decades have increased
the ability of public interest groups to participate in litigation. See NAACP v Button, 371
US 415. The Court has allowed greater interest group participation in litigation by broaden-
ing its standing doctrine to include such groups and by rarely denying motions by public
interest groups to appear as amicus curiae. See, for example, Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US
727, 738-40 (1972); United States v SCRAP, 412 US 669, 686-87 (1973); and Karen
O'Connor and Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of Rules Governing
Amicus Curiae Participation, 8 Just Sys J 35, 40 (1983).
"' Rule 24(a) is set forth on the next page.
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framework for analyzing motions to intervene by public interest
groups in public law litigation.
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF INTERVENTION BY PUBLIC INTEREST
GROUPS UNDER RULE 24(A)
A. Rule 24
There are two situations in which an outsider may want to in-
tervene in an existing lawsuit. It might want to participate in liti-
gation that could adversely affect its legal rights or other interests
(a "necessity" rationale). Or, it might want to adjudicate its legal
claims with similar claims in order to minimize litigation costs (an
"economy" rationale). Rule 24 provides for mandatory intervention
in the first situation, and discretionary intervention in the second.
Rule 24(a) allows intervention of right
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and the appli-
cant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties. 17
Although this provision expressly addresses the interests only of
the outsider, the presence in Rule 24(a) of language employed in
the Rule 19 joinder provisions suggests that, as with joinder, the
drafters also intended courts to consider the interests of the origi-
nal parties and the courts' own concerns in ruling on motions to
intervene.18 By evaluating the three underscored requirements of
Rule 24(a)-interest, impairment, and inadequate representa-
tion-courts can determine whether an outsider's interests are
strong enough to tip the scales in favor of intervention. When the
requirements are met, the court must admit the intervenor into the
litigation.
An alternative to Rule 24(a) intervention exists in Rule 24(b),
which allows intervention upon the court's discretion "when an ap-
17 FRCP 24(a) (emphasis added).
'8 James W. Moore, Jo Desha Lucas, and George J. Grotheer, Jr., 3B Moore's Federal
Practice 5 24.07[1] at 24.52 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1987) ("Moore's"). See also United
States v Hooker Chemicals, 749 F2d 968, 982-83 (2d Cir 1984) and Atlantis Development
Corp. v United States, 379 F2d 818, 824 (5th Cir 1967). It is not clear how much weight
should be given to the interest of the outsider relative to the original parties and the courts.
Compare John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 Ky L
J 329, 330-31 (1969) with Jones, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 56 (cited in note 12).
[57:279
Interest Group Intervention
plicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common." 19 Because this provision is based on econ-
omy rather than necessity considerations, it permits intervention
even when the outsider's interests are not threatened by non-par-
ticipation in the adjudication. But for the same reason-because
Rule 24(a) intervention derives from economy, not need-a judge
may deny the intervention when it would "unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."2
Public interest groups generally prefer intervention of right to
permissive intervention, fearing that judges will exercise their dis-
cretion under Rule 24(b) to defeat motions for intervention when
hostile to the underlying claim.2 Moreover, the reasons for which
public interest groups move to intervene are usually more aligned
with the theory behind intervention of right: public interest groups
intervene to represent affected outsiders in lawsuits that will have
an extended impact, not to save resources by joining in existing
litigation rather than initiating their own. This Comment will
therefore focus on Rule 24(a).
B. Judicial Interpretations of Rule 24(a)
Lack of guidance in the Advisory Committee Notes and a pau-
city of Supreme Court decisions on intervention of right have re-
sulted in widely varying interpretations of the Rule 24(a) require-
ments. Intervention by public interest groups implicates two
general splits in opinion among the federal courts of appeals. The
first involves the rule's interest requirement. Some circuits require
that the outsider claim a "litigable" interest-that is, an interest
sufficient to confer standing and a cause of action on the inter-
venor in an independent lawsuit-while others require a less tangi-
ble interest.2 2 This difference is critical to public interest groups,
whose concerns often would not support an independent suit.
The second dispute relates to the burden of proving inade-
quate representation. When an outsider moves to intervene on be-
half of the government (or on the same side as the government),
most circuits require an especially strong showing of inadequacy of
representation. The presumption is that the government, in its
,9 FRCP 24(b).
20 Id.
2 The practice of strictly construing procedural provision when hostile to the underly-
ing claim but relaxing them when sympathetic has been referred to as "insulated justice."
Jones, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 47 (cited in note 12).
22 See text at notes 33-55.
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representative capacity, protects the interests of all citizens, in-
cluding the public interest group and its members. Because public
interest groups often assert interests in suits to which the govern-
ment is a party, the higher burden erected in many circuits poses
an additional obstacle to their intervention.
The third requirement for intervention under Rule 24(a) is
that the applicant's interest will be impaired absent intervention.
Whether the intervenor is a private individual or a public interest
group, the impairment requirement is usually met when the litiga-
tion is likely to significantly affect the interest. 13 Thus, if a public
interest group's concern for integrated schools is significant enough
to satisfy the interest requirement, litigation to desegregate schools
would constitute sufficient threat of impairment. When an outsider
asserts a non-litigable interest in the litigation, the possibility of
impairment is especially clear because the outsider will have no
recourse through a separate suit. Because the impairment require-
ment presents no unique issues in the public interest group con-
text, this Comment will not address it in detail. The following sub-
sections examine the interest and inadequate representation
requirements.
1. The interest requirement.
In its first major decision construing the current version of
Rule 24(a), the Supreme Court gave a broad reading to the interest
requirement. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v El Paso Natural Gas
Co.24 centered on El Paso's divestiture of Pacific Northwest Pipe-
line Corporation for antitrust reasons. The Court allowed interven-
tion by the State of California, Southern California Edison (a large
industrial user of natural gas), and Cascade Natural Gas (a distrib-
utor of natural gas), reasoning that each of these intervenors had
an interest in retaining competitive conditions in the California
natural gas market, and that Cascade-as a distributor supplied
23 The only source of contention among the courts on the impairment requirement is
whether stare decisis itself is sufficient impairment. The possibility exists that a public in-
terest group, denied intervention in Suit A, will bring a separate and subsequent suit B in
which it faces a court that is bound by the precedential force of the decision rendered in suit
A. Most courts agree that stare decisis satisfies the impairment requirement, but only when
the first lawsuit can realistically be expected to determine the outcome of subsequent litiga-
tion. See generally Atlantis Development Corporation v United States, 379 F2d 818, 826-29
(5th Cir 1967); and 3B Moore's 24.07[3] at 24.63 and cases cited therein (cited in note 18).
Note that this debate only concerns public interest groups asserting litigable interests, since
the effect of stare decisis is felt only by a group subsequently initiating a second suit.
24 386 US 129 (1967).
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solely by Pacific Northwest-had a particular interest in the via-
bility of Pacific Northwest.25
The Court narrowed the interest requirement in its next deci-
sion, Donaldson v United States.$6 In Donaldson, a taxpayer
moved to intervene in an enforcement proceeding through which
the Internal Revenue Service sought production of his employment
records from his employer.2 7 The Court upheld denial of the mo-
tion to intervene, noting that the only interest asserted by the tax-
payer was his desire to prevent his employer from complying with
the summons. According to the Court, this desire was not a "signif-
icantly protectable interest" as required by Rule 24(a).2s
The Court's succeeding cases have failed to define "signifi-
cantly protectable interest." The most important question is
whether the term is meant to require a litigable interest. Shortly
after Donaldson, the Court permitted intervention even though
the applicant lacked a litigable interest. In Trbovich v United
Mine Workers of America,29 a union member sought to intervene
in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor to invalidate a
union election under the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act. The member had initiated the proceeding by filing a
complaint with the Secretary; he also wanted to intervene to pre-
sent evidence and argument in support of the Secretary's posi-
tion.30 The Court allowed intervention even though the statute
gave the Secretary of Labor an exclusive right to bring suit, rea-
soning that intervention in a lawsuit poses different concerns from
initiation of a lawsuit.3 1
1 Id at 132-33. For commentary see John E. Kennedy, 57 Ky L J 329, 340-42 (cited in
note 18); and David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies,
and Arbitrators, 81 Harv L Rev 721, 722, 729-30 (1968).
26 400 US 517 (1971).
27 Id at 521.
28 Id at 531.
29 404 US 528 (1972).
30 Id at 529-30. The member also sought to urge two additional grounds for invalidating
the election. The Court disallowed these claims because the legislative history of the statute
indicated that Congress intended the Secretary to perform a screening function in order to
protect the unions from frivolous litigation and to centralize any proceedings. The Court
believed that allowing the additional claims would circumvent this screening function. Id at
537.
21 Id at 536 and 7. Initiating a suit imposes much greater burdens on the court and the
defendant, and raises Article III concerns. See text at notes 52-55. The Court's comments on
the differences between intervention and initiation came in response to a contention by the
Secretary that the relevant statute barred intervention. The Secretary conceded that the
union member had an interest sufficient under Rule 24(a), although it is clear from the
opinion that the member did not have a litigable interest.
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In a recent opinion involving a challenge to the Illinois Abor-
tion Law of 1975, Diamond v Charles, the Court expressly declined
to decide whether intervention under Rule 24(a) requires a litiga-
ble interest.8 2 The Court at no point cited its earlier opinion in
Trbovich.
a. A litigable interest as a factor in intervention. A "litigable"
interest is one that would support an independent law suit, which
in turn requires constitutional standing and a cause of action. Cur-
rently, standing is said to require a "personal injury fairly tracea-
ble to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief. 3 3 A party has a cause of action
when entitled to a remedy by a common-law principle or a statu-
tory or constitutional provision. 4 The Supreme Court imposes an
additional representational requirement when an organization ini-
tiates a suit on behalf of its members, under what is known as as-
sociational standing: the organization must show that "(a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organiza-
tion's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit. '35
The existence of a litigable interest is an important considera-
tion in an intervention decision because it is an outsider's ability to
bring a separate suit that provides one measure of the significance
of its interest under Rule 24(a) and that threatens judicial re-
sources under Rule 24(b). Some of the strongest cases for interven-
32 476 US 54, 57-61 (1986). Specifically, the majority refused to decide whether an in-
tervenor must meet the constitutional Article III standing requirements in addition to Rule
24(a)'s requirements. However, the inquiries into standing and the existence of a litigable
interest were the same in the particular case. See note 34. The issue before the Court was
whether an intervenor had the right to appeal an adverse judgment in the absence of the
original defendant.
's Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 751 (1984).
To the extent that Congress can create redressable injuries by creating new legal
rights, constitutional standing and the existence of a cause of action are essentially the
same. See Diamond, 476 US at 65 n 17. But some recent Supreme Court decisions suggest
that the two may diverge when the causal connection between right and remedy is particu-
larly weak. Congress can define an injury by creating a legal right, but cannot create the
causal requirements of "injury fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct and likely to be
redressed by a judicial proceeding. Allen, 468 US at 752. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 Colum L Rev 1432, 1474-80 (1988).
35 Auto Mobile Workers v Brock, 477 US 274, 282 (1986), quoting Hunt v Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333, 343 (1977). Note that this additional
requirement does not apply when the organization claims an interest as an organization,
rather than as a representative of its members.
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tion to protect outside interests occur when a judgment will have a
binding effect on the outsider, when an outsider claims an interest
in a limited fund subject to disposition by the court, or when a
case might result in a decree that could conflict with a decree later
awarded to the outsider.3 6 Intervention is justified in these in-
stances because resolution of the dispute may actually or effec-
tively deprive the outsider of the right to pursue his own legal or
constitutional claim. Finally, the presence of a litigable interest is
especially significant in statutory cases because Congress's creation
of a cause of action indicates its intent that the courts protect the
interest.
But the existence of a litigable interest is only one measure of
practical adverse effect on an outsider under Rule 24(a).17 Con-
sider, for example, the interest of a lobbying group in a suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a law that the group sponsored.
The group has no cause of action, because it could not assert a
legal claim against either of the original parties to the action, yet
the litigation could completely undermine the group's lobbying ac-
tivities"8 and might deprive the court of the full representation of a
cause that involves the public interest.
b. A litigable interest: is it required of intervenors? The Su-
preme Court's decisions have generated a confused body of case
law in the circuit courts. Several circuits have held that Rule 24(a)
requires a litigable interest,3 9 although some of these have ex-
pressed willingness to construe the interest requirement flexibly in
public law cases. For example, the District of Columbia Circuit has
reasoned that Rule 24(a) was designed for "ordinary civil litiga-
tion" and might require "other than literal application in atypical
36 See generally Shapiro, 81 Harv L Rev at 731-34 (cited in note 26). For examples
involving public interest groups, see Adams v Mathews, 536 F2d 417, 418 (DC Cir 1976);
and United States v Reserve Mining Co., 56 FRD 408, 417-19 (D Minn 1972).
37 Contrast Rule 24(b), where the existence of a litigable interest is critical, since courts
and litigants achieve economy gains by combining suits only when the applicant for inter-
vention has the ability to initiate a second suit. It is thus significant that only Rule 24(b) is
phrased in terms of "claims" and "defenses."
38 This was the situation in Keith v Daley, 764 F2d 1265 (7th Cir 1985) (suit challeng-
ing legislation for which the anti-abortion group had lobbied). See also the examples in
Shapiro, 81 Harv L Rev at 737-38 (cited in note 26).
39 See, for example Southern Christian Leadership v Kelley, 747 F2d 777, 780-81 (DC
Cir 1984); United States v American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 642 F2d 1285, 1291
(DC Cir 1980); Wilderness Society v Morton, 463 F2d 1261, 1262 (DC Cir 1972); and Fran-
cis v Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 481 F2d 192, 195 n 7 (4th Cir 1973).
Contrast Chiles v Thornburgh, 865 F2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir 1989) (intervening party need
not meet standing requirements in addition to Rule 24(a) requirements).
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cases." 40 Along the same lines, a District of Minnesota court per-
ceived its proper role in one case as that of an administrative tri-
bunal, thereby enabling it to consider numerous interests in evalu-
ating intervention requests.4'
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have heard the largest num-
ber of cases involving public interest groups but have developed
radically different standards for evaluating their motions to inter-
vene. The Seventh Circuit narrowly interprets Rule 24(a), requir-
ing that public interest groups, like other applicants for interven-
tion, show a "direct, significant, and legally protectable" interest in
property or a transaction at issue in the case.42 The interest must
implicate a legal right of the outsider and be so direct that the
outsider could maintain a separate claim.43
In some circumstances, the Seventh Circuit requires an even
greater interest for intervention than is necessary for standing.
The Supreme Court has recognized that aesthetic and environmen-
tal harms to a group's members may confer standing, even when
the injuries are diffuse and widespread.44 Yet the Seventh Circuit
has denied intervention to an environmental group which almost
certainly had standing under the Supreme Court's test, reasoning
that "there is a qualitative difference between the 'interest' which
is sufficient for standing under the APA" (relevant in most suits
challenging regulatory action) and the interest required by Rule
24(a). 45 The Seventh Circuit's interpretation implies that Rule
24(a) requires more than a litigable interest, and thus that congres-
sional intent to create a legal right will not always support inter-
vention under Rule 24(a).
1o Nuesse v Camp, 385 F2d 694, 700 (DC Cir 1967), quoting Textile Workers Union v
Allendale Co., 226 F2d 765, 767 (DC Cir 1955).
"I Reserve Mining, 56 FRD at 413. See also United States v Hooker Chemicals, 749
F2d 968, 983-85 (2d Cir 1984). Although both cases involved similar claims by environmen-
tal groups, their results differed according to the courts' interpretations of the relevant stat-
ute's effect on the inadequate representation requirement. In Reserve Mining the court
granted the motion for intervention; in Hooker the court denied it.
42 Keith, 764 F2d at 1268.
43 Id.
41 See Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727, 734 (1972), quoting Hunt v Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US at 343; United States v SCRAP, 412 US 669,
687-88 (1973). In both Sierra Club and SCRAP, the groups claimed standing under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 USC § 702 (1982) ("APA"). 405 US at 732; 412 US at 685.
The APA may confer standing in the absence of a legal wrong when a person is "adversely
affected or aggrieved" by agency action. If so, Article III may not be broad enough to confer
standing for non-economic and diffuse interests in the absence of a congressional directive
such as the APA. See Sunstein, 88 Colum L Rev at 1440-41, 1474-80 (cited in note 34).
" United States v 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F2d 855, 859 (7th Cir 1985).
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The Seventh Circuit's strict interpretation of the interest re-
quirement, and its refusal to construe the requirement flexibly in
public law cases,46 erects special barriers to intervention by public
interest groups, whose interests by definition are not susceptible to
direct injury in the same sense as those of traditional private par-
ties. The court's decisions probably preclude intervention when an
outsider claims a non-economic interest in an action.47 This poses
special problems for environmental organizations, which generally
assert aesthetic, conservational, or recreational interests. Moreover,
the fact that litigation will affect an interest "intertwined" with a
group's existence is irrelevant to the right to intervene in the Sev-
enth Circuit.48 Thus, groups that have identified themselves with a
certain cause or lobbied for a particular statute cannot intervene
when the cause or statute is challenged.
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit generally
evaluates motions for intervention without reference to whether
the interests claimed are litigable.4 Interests found sufficient for
intervention have included a wildlife group's interest in protecting
birds and their habitats, a feminist organization's interest in the
continued vitality of the Equal Rights Amendment, and a lobbying
organization's interest in a statute that it sponsored.5 0 The Ninth
Circuit has not clearly articulated the conditions under which an
interest is "significant" within the meaning of Rule 24(a), but its
opinions suggest that the connection between the public interest
group and the particular litigation is an important factor.51
" Keith, 764 F2d at 1268-69. But see id at 1272-73 (Cudahy dissenting) (arguing that
"the interest factor must be broadly construed in 'public' cases").
17 Id at 859.
48 Keith, 764 F2d at 1269-70; and 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F2d at 859. Compare Pied-
mont Heights Civic Club v Moreland, 83 FRD 153, 157 (N D Ga 1979).
" See, for example, United States v Stringfellow, 783 F2d 821, 826 (9th Cir 1986),
vacated on other grounds, 480 US 370 (1987) (lower court decision to deny intervention as
of right while allowing permissive intervention under Rule 24 is not immediately appeala-
ble); and Washington State Building & Construction Trades Council v Spellman, 684 F2d
627, 630 (9th Cir 1982). See also Portland Audubon Society v Hodel, 866 F2d 302, 308 n 1
(9th Cir 1989).
'o Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v Watt, 713 F2d 525, 526 (9th Cir 1982); State of Idaho v
Freeman, 625 F2d 886, 887 (9th Cir 1980); and Washington Trades Council, 684 F2d at 627.
As noted above, the Seventh Circuit has found similar interests insufficient for intervention.
See 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F2d at 859; and Keith, 764 F2d at 1268-69.
11 In Stringfellow, 783 F2d at 823, the citizens' group was founded in response to haz-
ardous waste releases at the defendant's plant; in Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F2d at 526, the
Audubon Society had supported creation of the challenged conservation area; in Washing-
ton Trades Council, 684 F2d at 629, the public interest group had sponsored the measure
being challenged; and in Freeman, 625 F2d at 886, the National Organization for Women
had lobbied for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment.
1990]
The University of Chicago Law Review
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Rule 24(a) interest
requirement is superior to the Seventh Circuit's in its distinction
between intervention and the standing and cause of action require-
ments. Courts should not equate a Rule 24(a) "significantly pro-
tectable" interest with a litigable interest because, as the Court
emphasized in Trbovich, intervening in litigation raises different
concerns from initiating litigation. 52 An organization seeking to ini-
tiate a lawsuit threatens to impose much greater burdens on the
court and on the defendant. In addition, Article III of the Consti-
tution requires that the organization have suffered an injury from
violation of a legal or constitutional right and that the controversy
be justiciable. 3
When an organization moves to intervene in existing litigation,
however, the original parties have already mobilized judicial re-
sources. In this case the court's concern must shift to the policy
Contrast Portland Audubon, 866 F2d 302, which involved a challenge by environmental
groups to the harvesting of certain timber. The Ninth Circuit denied intervention to several
organizations with economic interests in continued harvesting because the relevant statute
did not protect economic interests. Id at 309. In Stringfellow, Washington Trades Council,
and Freeman, on the other hand, the group's members were within the class benefited by
the relevant statutes.
In dicta in Portland Audubon, the Ninth Circuit panel expressed a view of the interest
requirement much at odds with the views underlying other Ninth Circuit rulings, and
claimed a harmony with the Seventh Circuit which must be viewed skeptically. In recon-
ciling its approach with a Seventh Circuit decision involving the same statute, Wade v Gold-
schmidt, 673 F2d 182 (7th Cir 1982), the Portland Audubon court cited with approval a
footnote in Wade suggesting that intervention is inappropriate when the litigation "will not
affect a statute or regulation governing the [outsiders'] actions, nor ... directly alter con-
tractual or other legally protectable rights" of the outsider. 866 F2d at 309, quoting Wade,
673 F2d at 186 n 6. But the motions for intervention that were granted in Sagebrush Rebel-
lion, Washington Trades Council, and Freeman would not pass this test. In each case, the
outsiders benefited from the legislation or procedures at issue, but were not governed by
them. Nor did the outsiders have contractual or litigable rights that would be altered by the
litigation.
More importantly, in Portland Audubon the Ninth Circuit cited but did not address
the main argument in Wade-that only the government bodies charged with compliance to
statutes can be sued for noncompliance. In Sagebrush Rebellion, the Ninth Circuit allowed
a group to intervene on behalf of the government in a suit challenging the Secretary of
Interior's compliance with procedures governing the withdrawal of public lands. For cases
involving challenges to the constitutionality of statutes, contrast also Keith, 764 F2d at
1269, with Spellman, 684 F2d at 630.
It is possible, of course, for the Ninth Circuit to change its view of intervention, but so
dramatic a departure presumably would require an en banc decision; Portland Audubon is
better understood as the product of one panel on a notoriously broad circuit.
52 Trbovich, 404 US at 536 and note 7. See generally Shapiro, 81 Harv L Rev at 726-27
(cited in note 26); and Edward J. Brunet, A Study in Allocation of Scarce Judicial Re-
sources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 Ga L Rev 701, 725-26 (1978).
" Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, eds, Constitutional Law 76 (Little, Brown, 1986). A contro-
versy is not justiciable if it is moot, premature, or involves a political question.
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issues associated with Rule 24(a): weighing the organization's in-
terest against the interests of the original parties and the courts.54
Relevant statutes may aid the inquiry by indicating whether inter-
vention is consistent with congressional intent, but the absence of
a statutory right to bring suit should not automatically preclude
intervention, because litigation may significantly affect outsiders
even when they cannot bring an independent claim against either
of the parties. 5 This is particularly true in public law litigation,
where the eventual decree will affect widespread interests.
2. The inadequate representation requirement.
Trbovich v United Mine Workers56 is the only Supreme Court
decision to squarely address the requirement of inadequate repre-
sentation under Rule 24(a). In this case, the Secretary of Labor
contended that he adequately represented the union member's in-
terests in the proceeding. The Court disagreed with the Secretary,
noting that an applicant need only show that "representation of
his interest 'may be' inadequate; and the burden of making that
showing should be treated as minimal. '57 The Court held that the
union member had satisfied this minimal burden because the La-
bor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act imposed poten-
tially conflicting duties on the Secretary-a duty to enforce union
members' rights against their unions, and a duty to protect the
public interest by assuring free and democratic union elections.
Since the duties could dictate different approaches to the litiga-
tion, the Secretary's representation of the member's interests
might be inadequate. 8
The circuit courts have differed in their interpretation and ap-
plication of Trbovich. They disagree primarily on the degree of in-
adequate representation an outsider must prove if it wishes to in-
tervene on behalf of the government, as public interest groups
often seek to do. In the leading appellate case, United States v
4 See Trbovich, 404 US at 536-37. See generally Kennedy, 57 Ky L J at 330-31 (cited
in note 25).
51 Shapiro, 81 Harv L Rev at 726 (cited in note 26).
56 404 US at 538.
1, Id at 538 n 10. The Second Circuit has suggested that the Court mistakenly based its
minimal burden test on a pre-1966 version of Rule 24(a), even though Trbovich was decided
in 1972. United States v Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, 749 F2d 968, 986 n 16 (2d Cir 1984).
The earlier version of the rule required a showing that representation "may be" inadequate,
whereas the current version of the rule requires a showing that representation "is" inade-
quate. Id.
s8 Trbovich, 404 US at 538-39.
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Hooker Chemicals & Plastics,59 the United States initiated an en-
vironmental enforcement action against the defendant corporation.
Four environmental groups moved to intervene, claiming that their
interests in the action were more focused than the government's
interests.6 0 The Second Circuit distinguished Trbovich, where the
Secretary acted pursuant to a statute that imposed conflicting du-
ties, from Hooker, where the government was suing in its parens
patriae capacity. Under the parens patriae concept, a governmen-
tal body is presumed to represent the public interest when it is a
party to an action involving a matter of sovereign interest.61 Since
the environmental groups in Hooker did not challenge the govern-
ment's claim that it represented the public interest, they failed to
"justify requiring only a 'minimal' burden to show possible inade-
quate representation. 6 2 Thus, "a strong showing of inadequate
representation" was needed for intervention, which the groups
failed to meet.6 3
The courts have not specified the type of strong showing that
is needed to overcome this presumption of adequate representa-
tion. At a minimum, inadequacy of representation may be shown
by proof of collusion between the representative and an opposing
party; evidence that the representative's interest is adverse to that
of the petitioner; or proof of nonfeasance by the representative. 4
The Second Circuit indicated in Hooker that an outsider need not
show collusion to intervene, explaining that "a strong affirmative
showing that the sovereign is not fairly representing the interests
of the applicant" would meet the burden. 5 Nonetheless, the show-
ing required by the Second Circuit is almost certainly greater than
in Trbovich, where the possibility of a different approach to the
litigation was enough to satisfy the minimal burden test.66 Some
749 F2d 968 (2d Cir 1984).
60 Id at 973-74.
61 Id at 987. Some courts have applied a similar presumption when public interest
groups move to intervene on behalf of the government's defense of a statute or governmen-
tal action. See, for example, United Nuclear Corp. v Cannon, 696 F2d 141, 144 (1st Cir
1982).
62 749 F2d at 987.
63 Id. See also United States v City of Philadelphia, 798 F2d 81, 90 (3d Cir 1986).
Bradley v Milliken, 828 F2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir 1987) applies the presumption of adequate
representation in a case with a nongovernmental plaintiff.
6 3B Moore's T 24.07[4] at 24.68-69 (cited in note 18). See also Wade v Goldschmidt,
673 F2d 182, 186 n 7 (7th Cir 1982).
6 Hooker Chemicals, 749 F2d at 985.
66 Trbovich, 404 US at 539. For an example where the presumption of adequate repre-
sentation was successfully rebutted, see Fleming v Citizens for Albemarle, Inc., 577 F2d
236, 238-39 (4th Cir 1978).
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courts have also denied intervention as of right where the proposed
intervenor claimed a more specialized interest, greater conviction
or expertise, or where the intervenor would have argued the facts
differently. 67
As with the interest requirement, the Ninth Circuit takes a
quite different approach to adequacy of representation. In United
States v Stringfellow,65 the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the
Second Circuit's analysis. Like Hooker, .Stringfellow involved an
environmental group seeking to intervene in an environmental en-
forcement action initiated by the United States.6 9 The Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the Supreme Court's "minimal burden" test and over-
turned the district court's denial of intervention. In applying the
"minimal burden" test, the Ninth Circuit considered three factors:
"whether the interests of a present party to the suit are such that
it will undoubtedly make all of the intervenor's arguments;
whether the present party is able and willing to make such argu-
ments; and whether the intervenor would offer any necessary ele-
ment to the proceedings that the other parties would neglect. 7 0
Under this approach, assertions that the government might not
prosecute claims as vigorously as the public interest group or that
the public interest group offers expertise or a materially different
perspective have justified intervention. 1
The Ninth Circuit's approach to the inadequate representa-
tion requirement is probably a fairer reading of Trbovich. In Trbo-
vich, the Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that Rule
24(a) requires only a minimal showing of inadequate representa-
tion.7 1 It was then that the Court turned to the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act, observing that the conflicting
duties it imposed on the Secretary might dictate a different litiga-
tion approach from the union member's.7 3 In short, in Trbovich it
was in light of the minimum burden requirement that the Secre-
tary's conflicting duties became significant; it was not-as the Sec-
V See United Nuclear Corp., 696 F2d at 144; Keith, 764 F2d at 1270; and City of
Philadelphia, 798 F2d at 90.
68 783 F2d 821, 827 (9th Cir 1986).
10 Id at 823-24. The cases involved some of the same statutes.
7o Id at 827. Note that the Ninth Circuit has applied the same test when public interest
groups move to intervene on behalf of the government's defense of a statute. See, for exam-
ple, Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F2d at 527-28; Washington Trades Council, 684 F2d at 630.
71 See Stringfellow, 783 F2d at 828 (expressing concern that the original parties might
"bargain away" the organization's interests since the organization asserted claims against
both parties); and Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F2d at 528.
7 Trbovich, 404 US at 538 n 10.
73 Id at 538-39.
1990]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ond Circuit inferred-the Secretary's conflicting duties that gave
rise to the minimum burden requirement.74
Ir. APPLYING RULE 24(A) IN THE PUBLIC LAW CONTEXT
As noted in the previous section, Rule 24(a) aims at a balance
between the interests of the outsiders, the original parties, and the
courts. When a public interest group seeks to intervene in a public
law case, new factors arise that alter this balance. After a brief
description of these factors, this section will compare the relative
weights of the three relevant interests in the private law context
with their relative weights in the public law context.
A. Intervention by Public Interest Groups as a Distinct Inquiry
Public interest group intervention is a distinct inquiry from
intervention generally for at least three reasons. First, public inter-
est groups move to intervene almost exclusively in public law
cases. 75 This means that other parties have already made public
policy an issue, and that the litigation's outcome is likely to affect
the public interest group's members in the same way that it will
affect the original parties. The question raised by a public interest
group's desire to intervene in such a case is not the wisdom of com-
plicating a private dispute with a public policy concern; that com-
plication already exists. Once public policy has been made an is-
sue, the question becomes whether it is in the interests of justice to
exclude from the adjudication the expertise and advocacy that an
interest group may bring to bear on the case.
71 Hooker Chemicals, 749 F2d at 987 ("[a]ppellants have not pointed to anything like
the conflicting statutory obligations imposed on the Secretary in Trbovich to challenge this
claim and thus to justify requiring only a 'minimal' burden to show possible inadequate
representation"). The distinction proves critical in cases where a public interest group can
make a minimal, but not a higher showing of inadequate representation. Compare Sage-
brush Rebellion, 713 F2d at 528; with Keith, 764 F2d at 1270, and City of Philadelphia, 798
F2d at 90.
75 A search of Westlaw indicated that 171 federal appellate cases decided between Feb-
ruary 7, 1986, and October 10, 1989, included the term "24(a)." In eleven of these cases the
courts reviewed motions for intervention by public interest groups, and all can be character-
ized as public law cases (see text at notes 4-7). See United States v Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer District, 883 F2d 54 (8th Cir 1989); Harbor Against Land Takeover v United States
Forest Service, 881 F2d 1083 (9th Cir 1989) (unpublished); Republican Party of North Car-
olina v Martin, 865 F2d 1259 (4th Cir 1988) (unpublished); Bradley v Milliken, 828 F2d
1186 (6th Cir 1987); City of Bloomington, Indiana v Westinghouse Electric Corp., 824 F2d
531 (7th Cir 1987); California ex rel State Lands Comm'n v United States, 805 F2d 857
(9th Cir 1986); United States v City of Philadelphia, 798 F2d 81 (3d Cir 1986); United
States v LULAC, 793 F2d 636 (5th Cir 1986); EEOC v Nevada Resort Ass'n, 792 F2d 882
(9th Cir 1986); and United States v Stringfellow, 783 F2d 821 (9th Cir 1986).
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Second, public interest groups claim shared societal interests
as their basis for intervention. An individual acting alone may not
have a large enough stake in a particular environmental policy, for
example, to justify the time and. expense of intervention, but a
public interest group is a "medium through which its individual
members seek to make more effective the expression of their own
views. 17 6 While these organizations may have certain ideological
biases, they nevertheless represent a pooling of capital, interests,
and activities by individuals interested in vindicating similar pol-
icy concerns.7 Their significance thus lies in the breadth of inter-
ests represented by the organization as a whole.
Finally, public interest groups are often experts in the policy
areas involved in the cases in which they seek to intervene. The
three largest environmental organizations-the Natural Resources
Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Sierra
Club-depend on staff scientists to formulate policy and research
the data upon which their cases rest.7 18 The Consumer Union, a na-
tional consumer law group, has its own product-testing laborato-
ries.7 '9 These and other organizations, like the NAACP and the
ACLU, also develop expertise by focusing their efforts on particu-
lar areas of the law.80
B. Interests of the Outsider
The drafters of the 1966 amendments conceived of Rule 24(a)
as a means of involving outsiders in litigation that might practi-
cally impair their interests. When litigation centers on private
rights, the presence of a litigable interest provides one useful mea-
sure of the dispute's impact on the outsider. But the absence of a
litigable interest does not foreclose the possibility that the dispute
will significantly affect the outsider, particularly when litigation
centers on public or regulatory policy that will affect a large num-
ber of outsiders, regardless of any legal rights they might have
against the original parties. A court cannot order a city to rezone a
76 NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 US 449, 459 (1958).
71 Automobile Workers v Brock, 477 US 274, 290 (1986). Public interest law organiza-
tions received $105.4 million in contributions in 1983. Baum, Public Interest Law at 60
(cited in note 14). See also Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice
at 90-94 (cited in note 14) (describing the division of contributions among various groups
and causes).
71 Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice at 118-19 (cited in
note 13).
71 Id at 123.
60 Id at 82-83, 100-32.
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residential area to accommodate low-income housing, or formulate
an injunction to govern disposal of hazardous chemical wastes,
without touching upon concerns of the community as a whole.,'
Given this potential impact, representation of widespread
public interests in public law cases becomes important for two rea-
sons. First, resolution of a public law case usually depends on the
court's evaluation of factual elements, such as the consequences of
alternative schemes for correcting the substantive wrong.82 While
courts are experts on legal issues, they rely heavily on parties to
provide the evidentiary foundation for factual issues. Consider the
difficulty a court might face in formulating a decree to end race
and sex discrimination in industrial hiring, or to govern a corpora-
tion's waste discharges, in the absence of information about the
effect alternative resolutions will have on outsiders.8" Public inter-
est groups have both the expertise and the motivation to ensure
that shared societal values are considered.84
Second, theparties in public law cases often have extensive
control over the formulation of the eventual decree,85 and without
representation of outside interests in the negotiation process, the
original parties may bargain away the interests of affected outsid-
ers. Recent Justice Department school desegregation cases demon-
strate what can go wrong when affected outsiders are denied a
place at the bargaining table. Without the participation of groups
representing minority parents-who wanted stricter remedies-the
Department may have settled desegregation cases for much less
than legally obtainable.8 6 Intervention by a public interest group
81 See, for example, Joseph Skillken & Co. v City of Toledo, 528 F2d 867, 874 (6th Cir
1975), vacated on other grounds, 429 US 1068 (1977), circuit court decision aff'd on remand,
558 F2d 350 (6th Cir 1977); and United States v Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 749
F2d 968, 973 (2d Cir 1984).
82 Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1296 (cited in note 4).
8 United States v Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F2d 826 (5th Cir 1975); and
United States v Reserve Mining Company, 56 FRD 408 (D Minn 1972).
8 See Automobile Workers, 477 US at 289.
85 Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1298-99 (cited in note 4).
8' See Randolph D. Moss, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegrega-
tion Consent Decrees, 95 Yale L J 1811, 1812-14, 1828-29 (1986) ("the Attorney General
acts more in accord with the role of representative of the Executive than as a representative
of the victims of segregation"). The Justice Department has actually resisted participation
by parents whose settlement views differ from the administration's. Id at 1814. See also Joel
Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U Ill L
Rev 785; and Stringfellow, 783 F2d at 828. Although non-participating parents may chal-
lenge these decrees in later suits, the decrees will only be vacated upon a showing that the
remedial scheme violates a statutory or constitutional right of the parents or their children.
See note 122 and accompanying text.
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may also reduce the pressure on the judge to fill gaps in proposed
decrees that fail to account for the full range of interests affected
by the litigation.8
Other avenues do exist for presenting such concerns and infor-
mation to the courts, but traditional alternatives to participation,
such as amicus curiae status or reliance on governmental parties to
represent public interests, are often insufficient in public law cases.
Granting amicus status permits the public interest group a very
limited role in the litigation. Amici do not participate in decree
negotiations. More importantly, when a dispute centers on factual
elements, "a party to the litigation is in a clearly superior position
to insure that the range of issues and the evidence introduced in
support of these issues conform to the viewpoint asserted by that
party."88 Only parties to a suit have the opportunity to engage in
discovery.8 9 The very willingness of a public interest group to incur
large court costs in order to intervene in a suit indicates the limits
of amicus status in serving its interests °0
Even when the government is a party, it cannot always be de-
pended upon to represent outsiders' interests. One might presume
that since the United States Attorney General and state attorneys
general are "charged with enforcement of the rights of the state,"'91
executive officials will fairly represent the public interest in suits
when they act as parens patriae9 2 But the government is charged
with representing varying interests, "industry as well as individu-
als,"93 and when interests conflict or the government does not have
87 Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1300 (cited in note 4).
88 Jones, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 33 (cited in note 12) (emphasis added).
89 See Kennedy, 57 Ky L J at 367 (cited in note 25). See also Stringfellow, 783 F2d at
828 ("by engaging in independent discovery [the intervenor] might uncover facts that would
affect the remedy in a manner favorable to it or would materially influence the settlement").
90 Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at 723, 729, 734 (cited in note 52). Because of these deficiencies,
some courts have expanded the elements of amicus status in the public law area, permitting
amici curiae to participate beyond mere brief writing. See, for example, Hooker Chemicals,
749 F2d at 992 (lower court offered amicus status plus the right to call and cross-examine
witnesses); Hoptowit v Ray, 682 F2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir 1982) (lower court gave amicus
"full rights of parties to participate"); and SEC v Charles Plohn & Co., 448 F2d 546, 549 (2d
Cir 1971) (lower court allowed amicus to submit proof and be heard on oral argument). See
generally Krislov, 72 Yale L J at 694 (cited in note 14). Though this receptiveness is com-
mendable, when factual issues are important the aid that amici are thought to give the court
is probably best furnished through intervention.
91 Vera Langer, Public Interest in Civil Law, Socialist Law, and Common Law Sys-
tems: The Role of the Public Prosecutor, 36 Am J Comp L 279, 296 (1988).
92 See, for example, Hooker Chemicals, 749 F2d at 984-95; and United Nuclear Corp v
Cannon, 696 F2d 141, 144 (1st Cir 1982).
93 Reserve Mining Company, 56 FRD at 419. See also Richard B. Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1667, 1769 (1975).
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the resources necessary to represent all points of view, government
counsel must choose among them. 4
With discretion comes the potential for ideological bias. 5 The
Justice Department has been characterized as "the most politicized
agency per capita in Washington." '96 In addition, government agen-
cies can be subject to other forms of bias, such as the phenomenon
of industry "capture. '97 But while commentators have bemoaned
the effects of ideological bias in the executive branch, courts have
largely ignored the problem by denying intervention to organiza-
tions representing the excluded interests.98 The Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Sagebrush Rebellion v Watt99 stands as a marked con-
trast. Here, the court relied in part on a change in the Department
of the Interior's political perspective and on the new Secretary's
prior association with his opponents' legal counsel in holding that
the public interest group met the "minimal burden" test of inade-
quate representation. Finally, even when unaffected by ideological
bias, a government agency may simply pursue a valid claim with
inadequate vigor or commitment.
C. Interests of the Original Parties
Courts have traditionally deferred to the right of original par-
ties to control the direction of their lawsuit. 100 In a private dispute,
" Stewart, 88 Harv L Rev at 1770. See also Moss, 95 Yale L J at 1828-29 (cited in note
86) (noting that the Department of Justice cannot represent all possible interests in school
desegregation cases).
11 For examples of the impact of the Reagan Administration on regulating agencies and
public law litigation, see Selig, 1985 U Ill L Rev at 785 (1985) (cited in note 86); Moss, 95
Yale L J at 1812-14 (cited in note 86); and Dorothy M. Bradley and Helen M. Ingram,
Science vs. the Grass Roots: Representation in the Bureau of Land Management, 26 Natu-
ral Resources J 493, 495 (1986).
" Mitchell Rogovin, Reorganizing Politics Out of the Department of Justice, 64 ABA J
855, 856 (1978).
" Several recent books note that under President Reagan the EPA excluded environ-
mental organizations from its policy making process, but sought advice from regulated in-
dustries. See Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Policy in the 1980s:
Reagan's New Agenda 22-23 (Congressional Quarterly, 1984); and Richard A. Harris and
Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies 251-77 (Ox-
ford, 1989).
8 See United States v 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F2d 855, 862 (7th Cir 1985) (dissent
arguing that majority disregarded the possibility that the intervenor, not the plaintiff Inte-
rior Department, truly represented Congress's aim to preserve land in question); and United
States v South Bend Community School Corp., 692 F2d 623 (7th Cir 1982) (court did not
inquire into the Reagan Administration's record in the area of school desegregation).
713 F2d 525, 528-29 (9th Cir 1983).
100 Jones, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 39 (cited in note 12); and Weinstein, 13 UC Davis L
Rev at 232 (cited in note 12).
[57:279
Interest Group Intervention
such control is the logical counterpart to the responsibilities im-
posed on the parties: the parties must initiate the legal action, de-
fine its issues, and develop the facts. 10 1 Intervention threatens con-
trol because intervenors will usually introduce new evidence, new
issues, and new positions on existing issues.0 2 Loss of control is
particularly problematic for parties with limited resources who
would like to limit the issues in a case through stipulations. New
parties always bring with them new costs, and intervention may so
strain resources that the original parties cannot afford to maintain
the suit. 0 3
But when a case affects widespread outside interests to the
same extent that it affects the original parties, public interest
groups often have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the court
consider the full impact of its decision. Thus, parties who bring
public law claims should not expect to maintain the same control
over their litigation. 10 When a claim is made in order to affect
public or regulatory policy, the right of the original parties to con-
trol their lawsuit declines in importance. 05
D. Interests of the Courts
Intervention affects the courts' interests in fair and efficient
adjudication, both in the case at hand and in the court system as a
whole. When an outsider claims a litigable interest, intervention
may promote economy at a systematic level by avoiding duplica-
tive suits, which waste resources, clog dockets, and frequently in-
troduce the possibility of inconsistent judgments and complex col-
lateral estoppel issues.106
Even when a public interest group asserts a non-litigable in-
terest, intervention can offer considerable benefits in the case at
'o' Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1283 (cited in note 4).
102 Jack H. Friedenthal, Increased Participation by Non-Parties: The Need for Limita-
tions and Conditions, 13 UC Davis L Rev 259, 262-63 (1980); and Gene R. Shreve, Ques-
tioning Intervention of Right-Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw U L
Rev 894, 908 (1980).
101 Friedenthal, 13 UC Davis L Rev at 262-63; and Shreve, 74 Nw U L Rev at 909.
Other legal doctrines do offer some protections to the original parties. For example, inter-
venors must have independent standing to appeal a judgment in the absence of the original
party, and they cannot prevent a settlement between the original parties. See Diamond v
Charles, 476 US 54 (1986); and Local Number 93 v City of Cleveland, 478 US 502 (1986).
204 Jones, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 39 (cited in note 12).
205 Weinstein, 13 UC Davis L Rev at 232 (cited in note 12). See also Brunet, 12 Ga L
Rev at 745 (cited in note 52) ("The taxpayer subsidy of litigation detracts from the position
that litigants hold 'rights.' ").
106 Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at 719-20 (cited in note 52).
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hand. It may promote better decisions by ensuring that critical in-
formation is available to the court. The original parties will not
always produce the information necessary for just and accurate re-
sults; important information may be disadvantageous to both
sides, of no concern to either, or too technical to be within their
grasp.107 Public interest groups can fill the gap by showing the im-
pact that a particular resolution may have on the interests that
they represent. 08 Additionally, as the Supreme Court has noted,
"organizations often have specialized expertise and research re-
sources relating to the subject matter of the lawsuits that individ-
ual plaintiffs lack."'10 9
Permitting intervention by those with interests affected by a
pending judgment also serves the courts by supporting their own
legitimacy. The legitimacy of judicial action depends partly on the
appearance of fairness.1 0 Judicial decisions that affect widespread
interests may be more likely to be viewed as illegitimate when
courts fail to provide persons affected by the decision with a right
to be heard "before their fate is sealed.""' Giving outsiders a sense
of participation in the process is important; "[a]ccess to the legal
process ... is a logical extension of realistic awareness of law as a
process of social choice and policy making." 112
'17 See Stringfellow, 783 F2d at 828. See also Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at 729-31 (cited in
note 52); and Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1297-98 (cited in note 4).
18 Bryden, 66 Can Bar Rev at 507-08; and Jones, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 42-43 & n
48 (cited in note 12).
'09 Automobile Workers v Brock, 477 US 274, 289 (1986), quoting Note, From Net to
Sword: Organizational Representatives Litigating Their Members' Claims, 1974 U Ill L F
663, 669 (1974). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v United States Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission, 578 F2d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir 1978); Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil v Tennessee Valley Authority, 340 F Supp 400, 408-09 (S D NY 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 459 F2d 255 (2d Cir 1972); and Weinstein, 13 UC Davis L Rev at 232, 246 (cited in
note 12).
Of course, public interest intervenors do not just provide information; like all litigants,
they provide information that supports their position. But the fact that public interest
groups now represent both ends of the political spectrum mitigates the danger that facilitat-
ing intervention will introduce uniform ideological biases in judicial decisions. Baum, Public
Interest Law at 44-48, 55-56 (cited in note 14). See also Joel F. Handler, Ellen Jane Hol-
lingsworth, and Betsy Ginsberg, Organizations and Legal Rights Activities 13-16 (U Wis-
consin, 1974). More importantly, unlike legislative lobbying, which employs political pres-
sure to achieve desired ends, public interest group intervention calls on the power of ideas
to persuade a court.
'10 In Chayes's words, "[Jiudicial action only achieves [] legitimacy by responding to
-.. the demand for justice in our society." 89 Harv L Rev at 1316 (cited in note 4). See also
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1178 (1989)
(discussing the importance of the "appearance" of justice to courts' legitimacy).
11 Weinstein, 13 UC Davis L Rev at 232 (cited in note 12).
12 Krislov, 72 Yale L J at 721 (cited in note 14). See also Weinstein, 13 UC Davis L
[57:279
Interest Group Intervention
Of course, to justify intervention the systemic and individual
case benefits must outweigh the burdens imposed by the addition
of a new party. As one court has stated, "[a]dditional parties al-
ways take additional time. Even if they have no witnesses of their
own, they are the source of additional questions, objections, briefs,
arguments, motions and the like ... ."113 The fact that an outside
group wants to intervene suggests that it disagrees with an original
party's strategy, so the group will be more likely to request its own
pleadings, objections, and discovery, which will further complicate
the proceedings. 14 The problem of added complexity is particu-
larly acute in public law cases, where the litigation is already "ex-
traordinarily complex," many outsiders are sigfiificantly affected,
and greater judicial supervision is needed." 5
Although these determinations must be made on a case-by-
case basis, Judge Weinstein, a veteran of "at least a score" of pub-
lic law cases, doubts that liberality in granting intervention "will
produce costs in terms of complexity that outweigh the advantage
of access to the courts by those who may be affected by the judicial
decisions." 116 Relatively few affected outsiders actually want to ap-
pear in court, and most of those who do willingly accept reasonable
limits on their participation.1 7
III. A PROPOSED APPROACH
Since the interests of public interest group intervenors in pub-
lic law litigation differ from those of individual intervenors in pri-
vate disputes, a construction of Rule 24(a) that treated both situa-
tions the same would defeat the drafters' emphasis on
practicality." 8 When a public interest group seeks to intervene in a
private dispute, courts can legitimately impose the same require-
ments they would upon private individuals. The dispute will center
on private rights rather than public policy, so the burden imposed
Rev at 232 (cited in note 12); and Bryden, 66 Can Bar Rev at 508-10 (cited in note 108).
113 Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F Supp
972, 973 (D Mass 1943). See also Stadin v Union Electric Co., 309 F2d 912, 920 (8th Cir
1962); and Jones v United Gas Improvement Corp., 69 FRD 398, 402-03 (E D Pa 1975).
114 Dennis A. Kendig, Procedures for Management of Non-Routine Cases, 3 Hofstra L
Rev 701, 705-06 (1975).
11 Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1291, 1298 (cited in note 4). See also Sagebrush Rebellion,
713 F2d at 531 (Wallace dissenting).
',' Weinstein, 13 U C Davis L Rev at 246 (cited in note 12).
11 Id. See note 148 and accompanying text.
118 See 1966 Advisory Committee Note, reproduced in 3B Moore's 24.01110] at 24.11-
24.13 (cited in note 18).
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by the group's intervention will probably outweigh any benefit.'19
But when a public interest group moves to intervene in a public
law suit, the appropriateness of intervention will depend on the
litigation's potential effect on the organization's members, the con-
nection between the organization's purposes and the subject of the
litigation, the nature of the controversy, any relevant statutory
scheme, and the degree to which the original parties fail to rep-
resent outside interests. This section provides a framework for con-
sidering these factors.
A. Re-examining the Interest Requirement
When a public interest group asserts a litigable interest, the
court should usually grant its motion for intervention. Public in-
terest groups have demonstrated both the willingness and the abil-
ity to initiate litigation; thus, denying their motions for interven-
tion risks duplicative suits and possibly inconsistent results, or
impeding the group's ability to pursue its own legal or constitu-
tional claims.'20 The costs of duplicative suits are especially troub-
lesome in the public law context, where multiple issues and other
complexities already strain court time and party resources. 1 '
Moreover, a second suit poses a great risk of inconsistent and con-
flicting decrees: a court cannot desegregate a school or structure a
hazardous waste program under two different plans. Thus, the
original suit may establish the remedial scheme for all practical
purposes. 122 In sum, when the litigation is complex and an affirma-
tive decree likely, a litigable interest should be sufficient for
intervention.
"'I See, for example, Westlands Water Dist. v United States, 700 F2d 561, 563 (9th Cir
1983). In this case, the Ninth Circuit departed from its liberal construction of Rule 24(a)
and denied an environmental group's motion for intervention because "the contracts and
not public policy ... are at issue." Id.
120 See text accompanying notes 37-38.
121 Sagebrush Rebellion v Watt, 713 F2d 525, 531 (9th Cir 1983) (Wallace dissenting).
122 Although nonparties to a consent decree can collaterally attack the decree when
they have "conflicting claims" to those of the parties of the decree, Martin v Wilks, 109 S
Ct 2180, 2183-84, 2188 (1989), a second court will only vacate the original decree when it
violates the challengers' rights under the Constitution or a statute. Thus, the possibility of a
subsequent attack is often insufficient to protect outsiders who have a clear interest in the
remedial scheme and who would like to affect the manner in which a constitutional or statu-
tory mandate is implemented. See United States v Stringfellow, 783 F2d 821, 827 (9th Cir
1986); and Johnson v San Francisco United School District, 500 F2d 349, 353 (9th Cir




When a public interest group asserts a non-litigable interest as
its basis for intervention, other factors may still indicate a suffi-
cient stake in the litigation to warrant intervention. Unlike an in-
dividual intervenor, a public interest group has two types of inter-
ests when it seeks to intervene in a suit. First, it is interested as a
representative of its members. By pooling the resources of individ-
uals who share similar policy concerns, a group can be heard even
if high court costs would preclude intervention by individual
members.2 3
Second, a public interest group has an interest as an organiza-
tion. Often, this interest arises from a direct connection to the con-
troversy that gave rise to the litigation, as when the organization
sponsored challenged legislation or formed in response to a partic-
ular environmental hazard." 4 In other cases, the organization has
an interest because of its connection with a legal principle at issue
in the case. For example, the ACLU has long been associated with
First Amendment issues, and the NAACP with advancing the legal
rights of blacks.' 25 In either situation, the organization's interest
evidences a commitment to the litigation in which it seeks to
intervene.
This second interest is an important factor in intervention de-
cisions even when an organization brings suit in its representative
capacity. The Supreme Court has said that when an association
wants to initiate a claim on behalf of its members it must show
that the "interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organiza-
tion's purpose, ''1 26 reasoning that "[t]he very forces that cause
[them] to band together in an association will thus provide some
guarantee that the association will work to promote their inter-
ests. 1 27 This reasoning applies equally in the intervention context.
In addition, the nexus between a group's purposes and the litiga-
tion in which it moves to intervene usually indicates the group's
ability to provide specialized and technical information.1 28
In sum, public interest groups should be allowed to intervene
in lawsuits as representatives of their members for the same rea-
123 Bryden, 66 Can Bar Rev at 507-08 (cited in note 108).
124 See cases cited in note 51.
125 Baum, Public Interest Law at 49-51 (cited in note 14). For examples of this type of
interest, see United States v South Bend Community School Corp., 692 F2d 623, 628 (7th
Cir 1982) (NAACP); and State of Idaho v Freeman, 625 F2d 886, 887 (9th Cir 1980)
(NOW).
'2 Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 US 333, 343 (1977).
117 Automobile Workers, 477 US at 290.
128 Id at 289.
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sons that they may now initiate lawsuits on behalf of their mem-
bers. The difference is the type of interest that is relevant in each
context. Thus, by analogy to the associational standing doctrine,129
a public interest group should have the ability to intervene in a
lawsuit when (a) its members have an interest relating to the prop-
erty or transaction that is the subject of the action and are so situ-
ated that disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede their ability to protect that interest; (b) the interest it
seeks to protect is germane to the organization's purpose; (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit; and (d) the in-
terest is not adequately represented by existing parties.130
The associational standing doctrine is not without its critics.
These opponents argue that the doctrine prevents organizations
without injured members from litigating, creates mootness
problems when injuries are short-lived, and discourages courts
from recognizing standing when there are possible conflicts of in-
terest between members and leadership.' The most frequent crit-
icism is that associational standing is a fiction that forces groups to
"play the standing game by artificial rules" and rewards clever le-
gal drafting. 32 Even when an organization claims injury to its
members, the real party in interest is the organization itself, which
serves as legal counsel and supervises the litigation.3 3 These criti-
cisms apply equally to an analogous associational intervention
doctrine.
But there are reasons why such a doctrine makes sense, at
least in the context of intervention. Those who defend public law
litigation ground its legitimacy in the notion that these cases ad-
dress and determine national policy through specific controver-
sies.' Allowing outsiders to intervene on the basis of policy con-
cerns rather than as representatives of affected or injured members
undermines this institutional advantage. The drafters of the 1966
amendments to Rule 24(a) clearly sought to protect outsiders
against possible adverse effects; they did not intend merely to pro-
129 The requirements for associational standing are set forth in the text at note 35.
"I Compare this test with the doctrine of associational standing enunciated in Hunt,
432 US at 343, and Rule 24(a).
... Burnham, 20 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 164-68 (cited in note 9).
I32 Orren, 70 Am Pol Sci Rev at 738 (cited in note 14). See also Burnham, 20 Harv CR-
CL L Rev at 167-68.
"' Burnham, 20 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 168.
124 Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1308 (cited in note 4).
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vide a channel for advocacy of abstract policy positions. 13 5 In addi-
tion, the informational and legitimating benefits associated with
public interest group intervention depend largely on the fact that
the group acts as a representative of affected outsiders. Finally, in-
tervention by public interest groups and standing for public inter-
est groups should be treated similarly. The situations are analo-
gous and raise similar concerns. The Supreme Court's recent
reaffirmation of associational standing in Automobile Workers v
Brock"3 6 demonstrates its commitment to the doctrine's principles.
But the larger problem remains. Acceptance of an associa-
tional intervention doctrine does not indicate the type of non-liti-
gable interest that should suffice for intervention. 37 Several guide-
lines seem appropriate, at least in the context of intervention by
public interest groups.
First, courts should evaluate the group's interest with refer-
ence to the nature of the particular controversy. Courts and com-
mentators agree that Rule 24(a) is fundamentally a balancing
test-its interest, impairment, and inadequate representation re-
quirements attempt to identify those situations in which an out-
sider's interests tip the scales in favor of intervention. 8 Thus,
courts should recognize that the relative weights of the outsider's
interests, the original parties' interests, and the court's interests
are different in the public law context. When litigation centers on
public rights, such as the right to desegregated schools or a clean
environment, its resolution is likely to affect outsiders to the same
extent as the original parties. If the court's interests also favor in-
tervention, then intervention may be consistent with Rule 24(a). 39
In sum, courts cannot consider an outsider's interest in the ab-
stract; instead, they should evaluate the strength of the interest
relative to the other interests at stake in the litigation.
15 1966 Advisory Committee Note, reproduced in 3B Moore's T 24.01110] at 24.11-24.13
(cited in note 18).
"' 477 US at 289-90.
137 This problem remains unanswered even in the context of private motions for inter-
vention. As Professor Moore reports, "The exact nature of the interest required to sustain a
right to intervene has eluded a precise and authoritative judicial definition ..... 3B
Moore's 24.07[02] at 24.57 (cited in note 19).
138 See Hooker Chemicals, 749 F2d at 982. See also 3B Moore's 1 24.0711] at 24.52-
24.53; Shapiro, 81 Harv L Rev at 739-740 (cited in note 25); and Kennedy, 57 Ky L J at 330-
31 (cited in note 25).
139 These policy considerations seem to underlie the DC Circuit's decision in Nuesse v
Camp, 385 F2d 694, 700 (DC Cir 1967), and the District of Minnesota's decision in United
States v Reserve Mining Co., 56 FRD 408, 412-13 (D Minn 1972). Both courts emphasized
the importance of construing the interest requirement differently in the public law context.
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Second, courts should consider the effect of any relevant stat-
utory schemes. The Seventh Circuit, along with other circuits that
require a litigable interest for intervention, mistakenly analyzes
statutes only in terms of whether they vest outsiders with legal
rights.14 This emphasis on legal rights is incomplete because initi-
ating a lawsuit raises different concerns from intervening in a law-
suit. 141
Differences in statutes may justify seemingly inconsistent re-
sults in similar situations. Hooker Chemicals and Reserve Mining
Company are illustrative. In both cases, environmental groups
moved to intervene in suits brought by the federal government to
enforce environmental statutes. In Hooker Chemicals, the govern-
ment brought suit under the emergency power provisions of the
Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, and
the Safe Drinking Water Act.142 After extensive statutory analysis,
the Second Circuit denied the motions for intervention, relying on
the fact that Congress "'carefully restricted' the rights of private
persons to bring or to intervene in actions of this sort" in order to
maintain governmental control over water quality standards and to
provide the Administrator with necessary flexibility.143 However, in
Reserve Mining Company, the government brought suit under the
Water Pollution Control Act.144 Here, the court granted numerous
motions for intervention because the statute placed it in the role of
"an administrative tribunal" and required it to consider a multi-
plicity of interests.'4"
B. Re-examining the Inadequate Representation Requirement
Because the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the in-
adequacy of representation requirement is unclear, policy consider-
ations are especially important in choosing the appropriate test for
public interest group intervention on behalf of the government.
The appropriate showing of inadequate representation rests on a
choice between presumptions. The Second Circuit requires a high
140 See text at notes 42-48.
41 See text at notes 52-54; and see Trbovich, 404 US at 536-37. See also Smuck v Hob-
son, 408 F2d 175, 179 (DC Cir 1969). See generally Shapiro, 81 Harv L Rev at 726-27 (cited
in note 25).
1'42 Hooker, 749 F2d at 970-71.
143 Id at 987-88. But for a criticism of the court's analysis of the inadequacy of repre-
sentation requirement, see text at notes 72-74.
144 56 FRD at 413.
145 Id. See also Bennett v Madison County Board of Education, 437 F2d 554, 556-57
(5th Cir 1970) (Wisdom dissenting).
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showing of inadequate representation because it presumes that the
government adequately represents public interests. Professor Ed-
ward Brunet takes a different approach, reasoning that a lower
showing should suffice because willingness to intervene despite
large court costs suggests that the intervenor believes that it can
add something to the proceedings that will justify the expense. 146
Professor Brunet's presumption seems especially appropriate
where public interest groups and public law litigation are involved.
Unlike individual intervenors, public interest groups usually have
multiple opportunities for intervention. Thus, they have an incen-
tive to target the cases where their policy concerns are least repre-
sented. Moreover, public law cases often involve politicized issues
like school desegregation, environmental policy, and the constitu-
tionality of statutes restricting abortion or prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. Thus, the government may
fail to represent a public interest group's concerns even in the ab-
sence of bad faith, collusion, or failure to fulfill its duty. If a court
can limit intervention to minimize intrusiveness, as discussed be-
low, then there is little reason to require a strong showing of inade-
quate representation.
C. Limiting Intervention
The drafters of the 1966 amendments to Rule 24(a) noted that
courts may subject intervention of right to "appropriate conditions
or restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements
of efficient conduct of the proceedings.11 47 Several courts have re-
lied on this comment to limit their grants of intervention. For ex-
ample, courts have limited the issues that an intervenor may raise,
denied intervenors the right to a jury trial, limited intervention to
a particular stage of the trial, and required that multiple interven-
ors use restricted numbers of spokesmen and combine discovery
and motion presentations. 148 Limited intervention is a useful tool
,' Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at 723, 729-30, 734-35 (cited in note 52). See also Holmes v
Government of Virgin Islands, 61 FRD 3, 5 (D VI 1973).
"1 1966 Advisory Committee Note, reproduced in 3B Moore's 24.01[10] at 24.13
(cited in note 18).
,46 See, for example, Van Hoomissen v Xerox Corp., 497 F2d 180, 181-82 (9th Cir 1974)
(affirming trial court's limit of intervention under Rule 24(b) to issue of retaliation); Abbotts
Dairies Division of Fairmont Foods, Inc. v Butz, 421 F Supp 415, 419 (E D Pa 1976) (al-
lowing intervention under 24(b) only on issue of damages); United States v Massachusetts
Bonding & Insurance Co., 303 F2d 823 (2d Cir 1962) (affirming trial court's grant of inter-
vention under 24(b) on the condition that the intervenor waive its right to a jury trial);
United States v American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 642 F2d 1285, 1290-94 (DC Cir
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because it allows courts to incorporate the benefits of intervention
yet minimize complications, delays, and added expenses.14 9
Because flexibility is especially important in public law cases,
courts should condition grants of intervention to public interest
groups on their consent to reasonable limits when necessary to en-
sure manageability.15 0 Several factors may be helpful in determin-
ing the extent to which the group should become involved in a
case. A public interest group poses a stronger case for full party
rights when it has a litigable interest. If an organization claims a
statutory or constitutional right, its interest undoubtedly deserves
the court's protection.' 5' Public interest groups also have a
stronger case for full party rights when the interests that they ad-
vance are completely unrepresented by existing parties. In the ab-
sence of government involvement in a suit, intervention by a pub-
lic interest group may provide the information necessary for a just
result. When the government is a party to a dispute involving a
matter of sovereign interest, public interest group participation is
only necessary to the extent that it adds a different perspective,
provides specialized information and vigor, or legitimizes the deci-
sion making process.
Many commentators have already called for a more flexible
approach to intervention. They would provide a set of relevant fac-
1980) (allowing intervention under 24(a) for the limited purpose of appealing a collateral
issue); Bradley v Milliken, 620 F2d 1141, 1142-43 (6th Cir 1980) (allowing intervention
under 24(b) at remedial phase for the limited purpose of presenting historical evidence);
Fox v Glickman Corp., 355 F2d 161, 164-65 & n 3 (2d Cir 1965) (denying intervention under
24(b) but noting that petitioner might be entitled to intervene at remedial phase if defen-
dant's liability were later to be established); and Reserve Mining, 56 FRD at 420 (allowing
intervention under 24(a) by multiple applicants but requiring a single spokesman during
pretrial hearings for each intervenor, combined discovery, uniform presentation of motions,
agreements on witnesses and evidence whenever possible, and use of the original parties'
attorneys as liaison).
Like restrictions on parties, restrictions on intervention are not immediately appealable
but may be challenged after trial. See generally Stringfellow v Concerned Neighbors in Ac-
tion, 480 US 370, 376-77 & n 6 (1987); and id at 382-83 (Brennan concurring). In addition, if
the restrictions have the practical effect of denying the intervenor a right to participate, and
postjudgment appeal is likely to be ineffective, the intervenor may probably petition for a
writ of mandamus. Id at 381 (Brennan concurring). Note that a court has less discretion in
limiting intervention of right than it does in limiting permissive intervention. Id at 381-82.
149 See Shapiro, 81 Harv L Rev at 753-56 (cited in note 25); and Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at
743-44 (cited in note 52).
"I Judge Weinstein reports that limiting intervention is "entirely practicable," and
that most parties will accede to reasonable limits on participation. 13 UC Davis L Rev at
246 (cited in note 14).
1' Note that intervenors with litigable interests may be barred from asserting those
interests in future suits under the doctrine of res judicata. Thus, placing undue restrictions
on participation may present fairness problems. See note 122 and accompanying text.
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tors and leave intervention largely to the discretion of the trial
judge under Rule 24(b). 152 But there is a difference between flexi-
bility in allowing intervention under Rule 24(b) and flexibility in
limiting intervention under Rule 24(a). To be sure, discretion at
either level leaves room for arbitrary decisions; a judge who dis-
agrees with a public interest group's viewpoint can block its partic-
ipation almost as effectively by severely limiting intervention as by
denying intervention altogether. However, the two approaches lead
to different presumptions. Making the initial intervention decision
discretionary establishes a presumption that the public interest
group may not belong in the litigation. By contrast, allowing par-
ticipation with discretionary limits indicates that the group has
some right to assert its interests in the litigation but that the court
may balance this right against judicial manageability. In addition,
the reason that public interest groups move to intervene-to pro-
tect outside interests-more closely accords with the theory behind
intervention of right.
CONCLUSION
Because the interests balanced by Rule 24(a) are of different
relative weights in public law cases and private law cases, courts
should distinguish the two situations. Rule 24(a) as written can ac-
commodate public interest group intervention if courts are willing
to construe its requirements flexibly in the public law context.
First, a court should evaluate the interests of the group's members
in light of the nature of the controversy and any relevant statutes.
Second, it should examine the connection between the group and
the subject of the litigation. If the court determines that the
group's members have a sufficient interest in the litigation and
that the group has an appropriate connection to the litigation, it
should then apply the Trbovich minimal burden test of inadequate
"I See, for example, Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at 718, 742-45 (cited in note 52) (achieving
maximum efficiency requires allowing the judge to decide when the benefits of intervention
outweigh its costs); Shapiro, 81 Harv L Rev at 758, 761-63 (cited in note 25) (would permit
intervention of right only when a statute grants the right to intervene, the applicant is a
member of a class under Rule 23, or the applicant is a necessary party under Rule
19(a)(2)(i), and would leave permissive intervention to the court's discretion based on a list
of six relevant factors); and Shreve, 74 Nw L Rev at 924-27 (cited in note 102) (would use
the same factors as Professor Shapiro but would submit all motions for non-statutory inter-
vention to the discretion of the court). Contrast Jones, 14 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 47-48
(cited in note 14) (proposing creation of a class of applicants whose intervention is not dis-
cretionary, on the grounds that intervention decisions may depend on the court's sympathy
to the underlying claim) and Friedenthal, 13 UC Davis L Rev at 262 (cited in note 102)
(would limit opportunities for intervention).
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representation even when the public interest group moves to inter-
vene on behalf of the government. These initial steps may be un-
dertaken under the framework of an associational intervention
doctrine analogous to the current associational standing doctrine.
Finally, the court should condition any grant of intervention on
the group's consent to reasonable limits when necessary to ensure
manageability. 153
"I Reserve Mining, 56 FRD at 408, exemplifies this approach. The court began by rec-
ognizing that the relevant statute gave it a role much like an administrative tribunal. Id at
413. Given this statutory role, the court viewed Rule 24(a)'s interest and inadequate repre-
sentation requirements as favoring inclusion. Id. It allowed several environmental groups to
intervene in the litigation on behalf of the government because their environmental inter-
ests were more specific than the government's. Id at 417-20. However, the court limited the
grants of intervention in order to ensure manageability. Id at 420.
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